United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

UNMAS: Arms & Ammunition Advisory Section

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UNMAS in UNSMIL

• The JMACT concept, as originally conceived, no longer exists and UNMAS staff have transitioned into the UNSMIL Arms & Ammunition Advisory Section.

• This falls within the UNSMIL Security Sector Advisory and Coordination Division (SSACD) formally initiated on 01 July 2012

• The division’s focus is on six main areas:
  – **Arms and Ammunition** Advisory Section, **Police** Advisory Section, **Defence** Advisory Section and **Border Security** Advisory Section with **DDR** and **SSR** being handled as crosscutting issues out of the Directors office.

• Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section staff are funded by UNSMIL, UNMAS (UN Trust Fund for Mine Action) and UNICEF.
SCR 2040 (2012)

- UNMAS, as a component of UNSMIL, is mandated by the UN Security Council to:

  “counter illicit proliferation of all **arms** and related materiel of all types, in particular **man-portable surface-to-air missiles**, clear **explosive remnants of war**, conduct **demining programmes**…”

  “**coordinate international assistance** and **build government capacity** across all relevant sectors ... advice to the Libyan government to help **identify priority needs** for international support, engaging international partners in the process wherever appropriate, facilitation of international assistance to the Libyan government, and establishing a clear division of labour and regular and frequent communication between all those providing assistance to Libya”
Tripoli
Ops Teams: 4
MRE: 0

Zintan
Ops Teams: 2
MRE: 1

Misrata
Ops Teams: 7
MRE: 5

Jufrah
Ops Teams: 11
MRE: 0

Sirt
Ops Teams: 1
MRE: 1

Sabha
Ops Teams: 4
MRE: 0

Total
Teams: 29
RE Teams: 7
Task: 3,364
RE: 108,161
Accident: 115
Victims: 210

Organisations
Amman Foundation
DCA
Demira
HI
ICRC
MAG
Mechem
St. Barbara Foundation
FSD
Ukroboron

Legend
Accidents
- 1
- 5
- 10
- Storage Area (High Priority)
- Storage Area (Normal Priority)
- Major Campaigns
- Battles
- UXO Spot Tasks
- Possible NATO Duds

Populated Places
- City
- Town

Roads
- Primary Road
- Secondary Road
- Unpaved Road
UNMAS involvement

• First actors on the ground, facilitating deployment of UN and humanitarian personnel

• Assisted the Office of the Prime Minister with (draft) terms of reference for establishment of a Libyan Arms and Ammunition Management Committee

• Supporting the Libyan Armed Forces Armaments and Engineering Directorates in ammunition management

• Support to the MoI on weapons and EOD related issues

• Coordinating and managing training project with MoI and Libyan Army

• Provide IMSMA support to LMAC

• Advise and support local ammunition management with Misrata Katibas

• Provision of operations Liaison Officers in support of military councils in Misurata, Sirte and Sabah

• Provision of PSSM Officer working directly with the military council and katibas in Misurata

• Undertake EOD and BAC activities in Western Libya through a contract with MECHEM

• Undertake ammunition management activities countrywide through a contract with Ukroboronservices
Challenges

- **Government Continuity and Focus**
  - Four “Governments” in two years. Priority areas change with each Government.

- **Lack of National Coordination Architecture**
  - Ministry of Defense, Libyan Army, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs all claiming prime responsibility for aspects of mine action including weapons and ammunition management.
  - Outside of Tripoli the local military councils are the key actors on the ground.

- **Lack of Libyan Resources**
  - UNMAS/UNSMIL have provided technical advice and capacity building, upon request, to ministries which are short of the human, financial and operational resources to be able to undertake planning, strategy development and operations on the scale required.
Funding

- The Libyan Government is not currently in a position to fund all of its security-related activities.

- At current funding levels, the UN is not in a position to sustain its current operational activities beyond May 2013.

- Additional funding for mine action, PSSM and weapons-related issues should compliment that which has already been received from the Security Council and bilateral donations.
Key Lessons Learned

- **Early Engagement**

  - The success of UNMAS involvement to date stems from its early engagement with the NTC, which paved the way for further access and facilitated operations.

- **Respecting Libyan sovereignty**

  - By listening to and understanding the needs of the Libyans, strong relationships have been built and the ensuing trust and confidence in our activities has resulted in further requests for support.

  - By amending our strategy, engagement and focus as the political landscape has evolved, we have been able to adapt accordingly.

  - UNMAS has provided support to all Libyan entities who have requested our assistance.
Questions?